Backup

Overview

Wallet backups may contain a seed, private keys, wallet descriptors, channel information, account metadata, policies, labels, or database state. Different components restore different capabilities. A seed can reproduce keys but may not restore multisig cosigners, smart-account configuration, payment-channel state, or internal reconciliation records.

A backup should be encrypted or physically protected according to the sensitivity of its contents. Multiple copies can improve availability but also increase the number of places an attacker may obtain spending authority. Location, media durability, access control, and retention all matter.

Teams should document what each backup contains, when it is updated, who can access it, and how it is restored. Periodic recovery tests should occur in a controlled environment. A backup is dependable only when it can reconstruct the required system without relying on undocumented knowledge.

Evidence for Backup should preserve incident time, affected identifiers, last known state, claimant and approver checks, backup or share version, actions performed, credentials revoked, assets verified, discrepancies found, and final owner acceptance. Sensitive recovery material must not appear in the incident record.

Backup differs from ordinary retry or customer support because it restores authority after a control failure. For example, reinstalling an application is not successful recovery until the correct accounts, networks, balances, policies, and transaction history are reproduced and compromised authority can no longer act.

A controlled Backup process moves through detection, containment, claimant verification, approval, restoration, validation, credential or guardian replacement, reconciliation, and closure. Emergency access should be time-limited and should not silently weaken the authorization policy used during normal operation.